Meaning Meeting - Chenhao Lu / Is modal knowledge factive?
Meaning Meeting - Chenhao Lu / Is modal knowledge factive?
Linguistics | Philosophy
Wednesday, November 6, 2024
9:30 am - 10:45 am
Marie Mount Hall,
1108B
Wednesday November 6, Chenhao Lu leads the Meaning Meeting with his thoughts on whether modal knowledge is factive, abstracted below.
In A Paradox of Modal Knowledge, Seth Yalcin presents a novel argument against the factivity of knowledge ascriptions. In this talk, I will argue that his argument fails by
- Introducing Yalcin's argument for an incompatibility result between the following two principles about knowledge (where K is the knowledge operator and ♢ is the epistemic possibility operator):
Factivity (F): For all ϕ, Kϕ |= ϕ
Decisiveness (D): For nonmodal ϕ, Kϕ ∨ K¬ϕ |= K¬( ♢ ϕ ∧ ♢¬ϕ) - Introducing Yalcin's case for dropping (F),
- Putting forward a principle about knowledge, Quinean Question-Sensitivity; then showing that once this principle is adopted there will be no conflict between (F) and (D).