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Philosophy Work in Progress - Paolo Santorio / Ability modals as causal modals

A chalkboard covered in logical notation, with a man and a woman standing in front of it, arguing.

Philosophy Work in Progress - Paolo Santorio / Ability modals as causal modals

Linguistics Wednesday, September 21, 2022 1:00 pm - 2:00 pm Skinner, 1116

Wednesday September 21, Paolo Santorio talks about the semantics of ability modals at the Work in Progress meeting of the Philosophy Department. Since the Meaning Meeting has Caleb Kendrick presenting his own analysis of ability modals earlier the same day, this makes 9/21 Can Day at UMD – and nothing is sweeter than Can Day.

Ability modals as causal modals

Some modal expressions in language—for example, "can" and "able"—describe what is possible in light of someone's abilities. These modals are related to other modalities in language, but also give rise to anomalies that make them unique. I develop a general theory of ability modals that is broadly compatible with standard modal semantics, while predicting their peculiar behavior. The central idea is that modals of ability include reference to a notion of causal necessitation. At the basic level, modals of ability are simply possibility modals, i.e. existential quantifiers over worlds. In addition, they include a presupposition that states the existence of a causal connection between their subject and the event described by the complement clause. Interestingly, this account, differently from most analyses, divorces ability modals from a notion of agency.

Add to Calendar 09/21/22 13:00:00 09/21/22 14:00:00 America/New_York Philosophy Work in Progress - Paolo Santorio / Ability modals as causal modals

Wednesday September 21, Paolo Santorio talks about the semantics of ability modals at the Work in Progress meeting of the Philosophy Department. Since the Meaning Meeting has Caleb Kendrick presenting his own analysis of ability modals earlier the same day, this makes 9/21 Can Day at UMD – and nothing is sweeter than Can Day.

Ability modals as causal modals

Some modal expressions in language—for example, "can" and "able"—describe what is possible in light of someone's abilities. These modals are related to other modalities in language, but also give rise to anomalies that make them unique. I develop a general theory of ability modals that is broadly compatible with standard modal semantics, while predicting their peculiar behavior. The central idea is that modals of ability include reference to a notion of causal necessitation. At the basic level, modals of ability are simply possibility modals, i.e. existential quantifiers over worlds. In addition, they include a presupposition that states the existence of a causal connection between their subject and the event described by the complement clause. Interestingly, this account, differently from most analyses, divorces ability modals from a notion of agency.

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