Mayfest 2025 - Constraints on Meaning
When and why are certain meanings missing?
Research
Research at our top-ranked department spans syntax, semantics, phonology, language acquisition, computational linguistics, psycholinguistics and neurolinguistics.
Connections between our core competencies are strong, with theoretical, experimental and computational work typically pursued in tandem.
A network of collaboration at all levels sustains a research climate that is both vigorous and friendly. Here new ideas develop in conversation, stimulated by the steady activity of our labs and research groups, frequent student meetings with faculty, regular talks by local and invited scholars and collaborations with the broader University of Maryland language science community, the largest and most integrated language science research community in North America.
Featured Research News
The semantics and pragmatics of belief reports in preschoolers
Children under 4 respond in nonadultlike ways to uses of verbs like "think". Shevaun, Valentine and Jeff argue that this arise from pragmatic difficulty understanding the relevance of belief, rather than from conceptual or semantic immaturity.
Non-ARHU Contributor(s): Shevaun Lewis
Dates:
Children under 4 years have been claimed to lack adult-like semantic representations of belief verbs like think. Based on two experiments involving a truth-value judgment task, we argue that 4-year olds' apparently deviant interpretations arise from pragmatic difficulty understanding the relevance of belief, rather than from conceptual or semantic immaturity.
A single stage approach to learning phonological categories: Insights from Inuktitut
Much research presumes that we acquire phonetic categories before abstracting phonological categories. Ewan Dunbar argues that this two-step progression is unnecessary, with a Bayesian model for the acquisition of Inuktitut vowels.
Contributor(s): William IdsardiNon-ARHU Contributor(s): Brian W Dillion, Ewan Dunbar,
Dates:
We argue that there is an implicit view in psycholinguistics that phonological acquisition is a 'two-stage' process: phonetic categories are first acquired, and then subsequently mapped onto abstract phoneme categories. We present simulations that suggest two problems with this view: first, the learner might mistake the phoneme-level categories for phonetic-level categories and thus be unable to learn the relationships between phonetic-level categories; on the other hand, the learner might construct inaccurate phonetic-level representations that prevent it from finding regular relations among them. We suggest an alternative conception of the phonological acquisition problem that sidesteps this apparent inevitability, and present a Bayesian model that acquires phonemic categories in a single stage. Using acoustic data from Inuktitut, we show that this model reliably converges on a set of phoneme-level categories and phonetic-level relations among subcategories, without making use of a lexicon.
On Headless XP Movement/Ellipsis
Kenshi Funakoshi adapts the theory of movement in syntax.
Non-ARHU Contributor(s): Kenshi Funakoshi
Dates:
I make two proposals in this article: (a) an economy condition on the operation Copy, which states that Copy should apply to as small an element as possible, and (b) the “two types of head movement” hypothesis, which states that Universal Grammar allows head movement via substitution as well as head movement via adjunction. I argue that with these proposals, we can not only explain two generalizations about what I call headless XPs, but also attribute crosslinguistic variation in the applicability of these generalizations to parameters that are responsible for the availability of multiple specifiers.
Null Complement Anaphors as definite descriptions
"Ron won" is less like "Ron won it" than it is like "Ron won the contest."
Contributor(s): Alexander Williams
Dates:
This paper develops the observation that, for many predicates, Null Complement Anaphora (NCA) is like anaphora with a descriptively empty definite description (Condoravdi & Gawron 1996, Gauker 2012). I consider how to distinguish this sort of NCA from pronouns theoretically, and then observe an unnoticed exception to the pattern. For verbs like notice, NCA is neither like a definite description nor like a pronoun, raising a new puzzle of how to represent it.
On restructuring infinitives in Japanese: Adjunction, clausal architecture, and phases
Postdoc Masahiko Takahashi investigates the variety of restructuring verbs in Japanese.
Non-ARHU Contributor(s): Masahiko Takahashi
Dates:
This paper investigates the syntax of Japanese restructuring verbs and makes two major claims: (i) there are (at least) three types of restructuring infinitives in Japanese, which is consistent with Wurmbrand's (2001) approach to restructuring infinitives and (ii) there is a general ban on adjunction to complements of lexical restructuring verbs, which is best explained by an interaction of spell-out domains and Case-valuation. It is also shown that this ban regulates adverb insertion, adjective insertion, and quantifier raising.
Conservativity and Learnability of Determiners
Tim Hunter and Jeff Lidz find evidence that 4- to 5-year olds expect determiner meanings to be Conservative
Contributor(s): Jeffrey LidzNon-ARHU Contributor(s): Tim Hunter
Dates:
A striking cross-linguistic generalization about the semantics of determiners is that they never express non-conservative relations. To account for this one might hypothesize that the mechanisms underlying human language acquisition are unsuited to non-conservative determiner meanings. We present experimental evidence that 4- and 5-year-olds fail to learn a novel non-conservative determiner but succeed in learning a comparable conservative determiner, consistent with the learnability hypothesis.
Read More about Conservativity and Learnability of Determiners
Embedding epistemic modals in English: A corpus-based study
A corpus study on the distribution of epistemic modals, targeted at the question of whether such modals do or do not contribute to the content of their sentences.
Contributor(s): Valentine HacquardNon-ARHU Contributor(s): Alexis Wellwood
Dates:
The question of whether epistemic modals contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences they appear in is a matter of active debate in the literature. Fueling this debate is the lack of consensus about the extent to which epistemics can appear in the scope of other operators. This corpus study investigates the distribution of epistemics in naturalistic data. Our results indicate that they do embed, supporting the view that they contribute semantic content. However, their distribution is limited, compared to that of other modals. This limited distribution seems to call for a nuanced account: while epistemics are semantically contentful, they may require special licensing conditions.
Read More about Embedding epistemic modals in English: A corpus-based study
Young Children's Understanding of "more" and Discrimination of Number and Surface Area
How do three-year-olds understand "more"? This study suggests they use Approximate Number System in verifying claims with "more" and a count noun, and an Approximate Area System with mass nouns.
Non-ARHU Contributor(s): Darko Odic, Tim Hunter, Justin Halberda
Dates:
The psychology supporting the use of quantifier words (e.g., “some,” “most,” “more”) is of interest to both scientists studying quantity representation (e.g., number, area) and to scientists and linguists studying the syntax and semantics of these terms. Understanding quantifiers requires both a mastery of the linguistic representations and a connection with cognitive representations of quantity. Some words (e.g., “many”) refer to only a single dimension, whereas others, like the comparative “more,” refer to comparison by numeric (“more dots”) or nonnumeric dimensions (“more goo”). In the present work, we ask 2 questions. First, when do children begin to understand the word “more” as used to compare nonnumeric substances and collections of discrete objects? Second, what is the underlying psychophysical character of the cognitive representations children utilize to verify such sentences? We find that children can understand and verify sentences including “more goo” and “more dots” at around 3.3 years—younger than some previous studies have suggested—and that children employ the Approximate Number System and an Approximate Area System in verification. These systems share a common underlying format (i.e., Gaussian representations with scalar variability). The similarity in the age of onset we find for understanding “more” in number and area contexts, along with the similar psycho- physical character we demonstrate for these underlying cognitive representations, suggests that children may learn “more” as a domain-neutral comparative term.
Derivational order in syntax: Evidence and architectural consequences
A précis of the evidence for left‐to‐right derivations in syntax, and how this relates to the nature of real‐time mechanisms for building linguistic structure.
Contributor(s): Colin PhillipsNon-ARHU Contributor(s): Shevaun Lewis
Dates:
Publisher: Elsevier
Publisher: Elsevier
Standard
generative
grammars
describe
language
in
terms
that
appear
distant
from
considerations
of
everyday,
real‐time
language
processes.
To
some
this
is
a
critical
flaw,
while
to
others
this
is
a
clear
virtue.
One
type
of
generative
grammar
defines
a
well‐formed
sentence
as
a
static,
structured
representation
that
simultaneously
satisfies
all
relevant
constraints
of
the
language,
with
no
regard
to
how
the
representation
is
assembled
(e.g.,
Sag,
Wasow,
&
Bender,
2003).
Another
type
of
generative
grammar
defines
a
well‐formed
sentence
as
a
derivation,
or
sequence
of
representations,
that
describes
how
the
sentence
is
gradually
assembled,
often
including
various
transformations
that
move
words
or
phrases
from
one
position
to
another
in
a
structure.
In
the
most
popular
current
version
of
the
derivational
approach,
derivations
proceed
‘upwards’,
starting
from
the
most
deeply
embedded
terminal
elements
in
the
sentence,
which
are
often
towards
the
right
of
a
sentence
(e.g.,
Chomsky,
1995;
Carnie,
2006).
Such
derivations
tend
to
proceed
in
a
right‐to‐left
order,
which
is
probably
the
opposite
of
the
order
in
which
sentences
are
assembled
in
everyday
tasks
such
as
speaking
and
understanding.
Since
these
theories
make
no
claim
to
being
accounts
of
such
everyday
processes,
the
discrepancy
causes
little
concern
among
the
theories'
creators.
Generative
grammars
are
typically
framed
as
theories
of
speakers’
task‐independent
knowledge
of
their
language,
and
these
are
understood
to
be
distinct
from
theories
of
how
specific
communicative
tasks
might
put
that
knowledge
to
use.
Set
against
this
background
are
a
number
of
recent
proposals
that
various
linguistic
phenomena
can
be
better
understood
in
terms
of
derivations
that
incrementally
assemble
structures
in
a
(roughly)
left‐to‐right
order.
One
can
evaluate
these
proposals
based
simply
on
how
well
they
capture
the
acceptability
judgments
that
they
aim
to
explain,
i.e.,
standard
conditions
of
'descriptive
adequacy'.
But
it
is
hard
to
avoid
the
question
of
whether
it
is
mere
coincidence
that
left‐to‐right
derivations
track
the
order
in
which
sentences
are
spoken
and
understood.
It
is
also
natural
to
ask
how
left‐to‐right
derivations
impact
the
psychological
commitments
of
grammatical
theories.
Are
they
procedural
descriptions
of
how
speakers
put
together
sentences
in
real
time
(either
in
comprehension
or
in
production)?
Do
they
amount
to
a
retreat
from
linguists’
traditional
agnosticism
about
‘performance
mechanisms’?
These
are
questions
about
what
a
grammatical
theory
is
a
theory
of,
and
they
are
the
proverbial
elephant
in
the
room
in
discussions
of
left‐to‐right
derivations
in
syntax,
although
the
issues
have
not
been
explored
in
much
detail.
Here
we
summarize
the
current
state
of
some
of
the
evidence
for
left‐to‐right
derivations
in
syntax,
and
how
this
relates
to
a
number
of
findings
by
our
group
and
others
on
the
nature
of
real‐time
structure
building
mechanisms.
Some
of
these
questions
have
been
aired
in
previous
work
(e.g.,
Phillips
1996,
2004),
but
we
have
come
to
believe
that
the
slogan
from
that
earlier
work
(“the
parser
is
the
grammar”)
is
misleading
in
a
number
of
respects,
and
we
offer
an
updated
position
here.
Input and Intake in Language Acquisition
Acquiring a grammar involves representing the environment and making statistical inferences within a space of linguistic hypotheses. Annie illustrates with experimental, computational and corpus studies of children acquiring Tsez, Norwegian and English.
Non-ARHU Contributor(s): Ann C. Gagliardi
Dates:
This dissertation presents an approach for a productive way forward in the study of language acquisition, sealing the rift between claims of an innate linguistic hypothesis space and powerful domain general statistical inference. This approach breaks language acquisition into its component parts, distinguishing the input in the environment from the intake encoded by the learner, and looking at how a statistical inference mechanism, coupled with a well de fined linguistic hypothesis space could lead a learn to infer the native grammar of their native language. This work draws on experimental work, corpus analyses and computational models of Tsez, Norwegian and English children acquiring word meanings, word classes and syntax to highlight the need for an appropriate encoding of the linguistic input in order to solve any given problem in language acquisition.